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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CURTIS W. COLLINS, 
Priority 10 
Court of Appeals #: 20010371-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(d) Utah 
Cede Annotated, 1953 As Amended. This court entered an order granting permission to appeal 
on June 29, 2001. [Addendum 1] 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the warrantless search of the Defendant's person by Deputy Lynn Yeates of tlie 
Box Elder County Sheriffs Office and die warrantless search of the Defendant's 
belongings by Officer J. Baty of tlie Box Elder County Sheriffs Office justified by an 
implied exception to the warrant requirement contained in 62A-12-231(l)(a) and/or 
62A-12-232(4) Utah Code Annotated 1953 As Amended? 
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Standard of Review. The standard of review of the lower court's determination that 
62A-12-231(l)(a) and 62A-12-232(4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 As Amended, 
contained an implied exception to the warrant requirement that justified the warrandess 
searches in question in this case is one of correctness with no deference to tlie lower 
court's conclusions. Salt Lake City v. Davidson. 2000 UT App 12, 994 P.2d 1283; State 
v. Gray. 1953 UT App, 851 P.2d 1217. 
Issue Preserved. The issue was preserved in the trial court by the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress. [R. 37-38, Addendum 2] 
2. Was the warrantless search of the Defendant's person by Deputy Lynn Yeates of tlie 
Box Elder County Sheriffs Office and the warrandess search of the Defendant's 
belongings by Officer J. Baty of die Box Elder County Sheriffs Office justified by the 
''emergency circumstances" and die "community caretaker exception" as concluded by 
die lower court? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review of die lower court's conclusion diat the 
exceptions justified the warrandess searches in question in this case is one of correctness 
widi no deference to the lower court's conclusions. Salt Lake City v. Davidson supra, 
and State vs. Gray supra. 
Issue Preserved. The issue was preserved in the trial court by the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress. [R. 37-38; Addendum 2] 
III. STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL 
United States Constitution, Fourdi Amendment 
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"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized/5 
Utah Code Annotated, 62A-12-231. Involuntary Commitment - Procedures 
"(1) An adult may not be involuntarily committed to the custody of a local 
mental health authority except under the following provisions: 
(a) emergency procedures for temporary commitment upon medical or 
designated examiner certification, as provided in Subsection 62A-12-232(1); 
(b) emergency procedures for temporary commitment without endorsement of 
medical or designated examiner certification, as provided in Subsection 62A-12-
232(2); or 
(c) commitment on court order, as provided in Section 62A-12-234. 
(2) A person under 18 years of age may not be committed to a local mental 
health authority, but may be committed to the division in accordance with the 
provisions of Part 2A." 
Utah Code Annotated, 62A-12-232. Temporary Commitment - Requirements and Procedures 
[Addendum 3] 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." 
IV. STATEMENT O F CASE 
1. Nature and Course of Proceedings. The Defendant is charged with possession of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony. A preliminary hearing was held before the 
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, District Court Judge, on January 17,2001 *. The Defendant 
xThe preliminary hearing transcript was not available at the time the Court ruled on the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress and the parties did not stipulate or agree that the facts 
determined at preliminary hearing could be considered. 
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then filed a Motion to Suppress, with attached Memorandum and exhibits, evidence 
discovered through a warrantless search of the Defendant's person by Deputy 
Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder County Sheriffs Office, and a warrantless search of the 
Defendant's belongings by Officer J. Baty of the Box Elder County Sheriffs Office. 
[R. 37-46, Addendum 2] The State filed a written response to the Defendant's Motion. 
[R. 55-58, Addendum 4] After a hearing on March 26, 2001 before the Honorable 
Ben H. Hadfield, the lower court issued a Memorandum Decision denying the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. [R. 49-54, Addendum 5] The Defendant then 
petitioned this court for permission to appeal the interlocutory order denying his Motion 
to Suppress. 
Statement of Relevant Facts. The facts relevant to the issues presented for review are 
as follows:2 
The Defendant went to an appointment with Dr. William F. Weber at Bear River Mental 
Health in Brigham City on July 27, 2000. Dr. Weber "felt" that the Defendant had not 
been taking his medication and that he needed to be hospitalized and would tiot go on 
his own. [R. 44] 
The Brigham City Police were called and after they arrived Dr. Weber prepared and 
executed the "Certificate for Commitment to Local Mental Health Authority E mergency 
2The facts before the court on which the Motion to Suppress was determined consisted 
of the Statement of Facts contained in the Defendant's Memorandum and the exhibits attached 
thereto. [T. Motion Hearing, p. 2, In. 20-22; Defendant's Memorandum, II. Facts and attached 
exhibits, R. 40-46, Addendum 2; Plaintiffs Response - Relevant Facts, R. 55, Addendum 3] 
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Procedure" and delivered it to the Brigham City policeman on the scene. [R. 43] The 
police then took tlie Defendant into "custody with minimal resistance." Apparently, the 
Brigham City Police conducted an initial search of the Defendant at this point. The 
Defendant was then walked across the parking lot to the Emergency Room at the 
Brigham City Community Hospital. The police then conducted a second search, "prior 
to taking him into the Emergency Room we conducted a better search." [R. 44] 
At the Emergency Room, the Defendant was administered drugs to calm him down. 
Officer Baty and Deputy Hoffman were summoned to assist in the transport of the 
Defendant to tlie Logan hospital and "were advised that Mr. Collins had been heavily 
sedated because he was being uncooperative and hostile with the hospital staff and 
Brigham City Officers." [R. 46] 
The Brigham City Ambulance transported the Defendant to the Logan Regional 
Hospital, Deputy Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder County Sheriffs Office was a member 
of the ambulance crew. Officer J. Baty of the Box Elder County Sheriffs Office also 
rode along on tlie ambulance to Logan. The Defendant's hands were handcuffed behind 
him on the trip to Logan. [R. 46] 
When the ambulance arrived at tlie Logan Regional Hospital, Officer J. Baty, Deputy 
Lynn Yeates and two (2) other members of tlie ambulance crew took the Defendant into 
the Mental Health Unit of tlie hospital. In tlie Mental Health Unit, "Chief Deputy 
Yeates did a complete pat down search of Mr. Collins." Deputy Yeates removed tlie 
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Defendant's wallet from his back pocket and a knife sheath from inside the front of his 
pants and gave them to Officer Baty. [R. 46] 
Officer Baty searched the wallet and found a baggy containing a green leafy substance. 
Officer Baty also opened the knife sheath and found a small baggy with a white powdery 
substance inside. Officer Baty also discovered a straw and several pieces of foil with a 
burnt substance on them. Officer Baty placed all of these items into a large plastic bag. 
When the ambulance returned to Brigham City it went directly to the Brigham City 
Police Department and Officer Baty turned the items over to Officer Erickson. [R. 46] 
Officer Erickson then examined the bag of items and stated in his report "I discovered 
that the sheath contained a baggy of possible meth and a baggy of some unknown 
substance." [R. 45] 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the lower court took the 
matter under advisement and stated that it would get a written decision out in about two 
(2) weeks. [T. Motion Hearing p. 10, In. 16 - p. 11, In. 6] 
V. SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T 
The warrantless searches of the Defendant's person and of his belongings were in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution which prohibit all unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under both the state and federal 
Constitutions, subject to only a few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions. The burden is upon the state to establish compliance with one of those 
nef.wpd 10 
exceptions. The facts do not support the existence of an exception to tlie warrant 
requirement. 
2. Utah Code Annotated, 62A-12-232(1) (a) (i) was not complied with when tlie Defendant 
was committed into the custody of the local mental health authority. 62A-12-231(l)(a) 
and/or 62A-12-232(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953 As Amended, does not create an 
implied exception to the warrant requirement. In the event the court determines that 
there is an implied exception, it is restricted by the limitations of the "emergency 
circumstances" doctrine. Any implied exception to the warrant requirement must be 
limited by constitutional protections. The facts failed to establish that tlie warrantless 
searches of the Defendant's person and belongings were justified by any such implied 
exception. 
3. The facts failed to establish that the warrantless searches of the Defendant's person and 
belongings by Deputy Yeates and Officer Baty fell within tlie "emergency circumstances" 
and/or tlie "community caretaker" exceptions to the warrant requirement. There was 
no basis for tlie lower court to find that Deputy Yeates or Officer Baty believed an 
emergency existed that required their immediate assistance which was reasonably 
associated with tlie warrantless searches. There are no facts on which it could be 
determined that tlie warrantless searches, particularly the search by Officer Baty, were 
not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. 
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VI. ARGUMENTS 
1. The facts failed to establish that the warrantless searches of the Defendant's person and 
belongings were justified by one of the established exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah State Constitution both prohibit all unreasonable searches and seizures. The 
law is well settled, "warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under both the state and 
federal constitutions." State v. Morck. 1991 UT App, 821 P.2d 1190; State v. Larocco. 
1990 Utah, 794 P.2d 460; Katz v. United States. 1967,389 U.S. 347; State v. Wright 1999 
UT App 86, 977 P.2d 505; State v. Shoulderblade. 1995 Utah, 905 P.2d 289; State v. 
Brown. 1992 Utah, 853 P.2d 851 
Warrantless searches are permitted only where they satisfy the traditional justifications 
to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence. 
State v. Larocco supra 
The warrant requirement is "subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions/' the state bears the burden of establishing compliance with one 
of the exceptions. State v. Larocco supra; State v. Christensen, 1984 Utah, 676 P.2d 408; 
State v. Limb. 1978 Utah, 581 P.2d 142 
In order for an exception to apply, at the time of the search, there must have been both 
probable cause that constituted a danger, and exigent circumstances which required 
action before a warrant could be obtained. The state's burden is to show that both 
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probable cause and exigent circumstances existed at the time of the search. The facts in this 
case do not justify the warrantless searches based on any of the recognized exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. 
At the time of the warrantless search of the Defendant's person by Deputy Lynn Yeates 
and the warrantless search of his belongings by Officer Baty, die Defendant did not pose 
any danger. The Defendant's person had already been searched twice by the Brigham 
City Police. [R. 44] The Defendant was heavily sedated and his hands were handcuffed 
behind his back. The Defendant had been delivered to the Mental Health Unit of the 
Logan Regional Hospital. [R. 40] 
It is a reasonable assumption that the hospital has procedures to ensure that its staff and 
its patients are safe and procedures which protect the patient's rights. The District 
Court's decision failed to consider hospital policies and procedures. There is no 
evidence to support a finding that the warrantless search of the Defendant's belongings 
by Officer Baty was based upon probable cause and that Officer Baty could not have 
taken the time to involve the court and secure a warrant if probable cause existed. The 
only basis for Officer Baty's warrantless search, other than to obtain evidence, was a 
possible need to inventory the Defendant's belongings. In order to assure equal 
protection inventories need to be conducted pursuant to "a regularized set of procedures 
which adequately guard against arbitrariness." State v. Hygh. 1985 UT, 711 P.2d 264 If 
an inventory of the Defendant's belongings was necessary, it should have been 
conducted by the Mental Health Unit of the hospital pursuant to the hospital's policies 
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and procedures. There were no "exigent circumstances" which justifed dispensing with 
the judicial oversight which comes with the warrant requirement. 
The only theory advanced by the state in this case was that the searches being questioned 
were "incident to arrest." [R. 55-58] The lower court summarily rejected the state's 
"incident to arrest theory." [T. Motion Hearing p 3, In 24-25] However, rather than 
granting the Motion to Suppress based upon the state's failure to present a viable theory 
to justify the warrantless searches or advising the state to present any other theories 
which it might have, the lower court then conducted independent research and 
developed a new theory to justify the warrantless searches. The lower court then issued 
its Memorandum Decision, which was based upon its independent research witliout 
allowing the Defendant to address the new theories on which the lower couit based its 
decision. The lower court in effect usurped or otherwise assumed the role of counsel 
for the state. The lower court's approach is analogous to the "apparent on the record" 
theory addressed by this court in State vs. Montoya, 1997 UT App, 937 P.2d 145. The 
right of the Defendant to fully address all issues being advanced in opposition to his 
Motion is a critical due process component. The lower court's Memorandum Decision 
advanced new theories of which the Defendant neither had notice or an opportunity to 
address, therefore, the Defendant's due process rights were denied. This court in 
addressing the problem as it related to "affirming on appeal based on new grounds" not 
raised in the lower court stated: 
"Critical to affirmance is the requirement that the ground or theory be 'apparent on the 
record.' Id. If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the first time on appeal is not 
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apparent on the record, the principle of affirming on any proper ground has no 
application. To hold otherwise would invite the prevailing party to selectively focus on 
issues below, the effect of which is holding back issues that the opposition had neither 
notice of nor an opportunity to address. Because of this due process component, 
'apparent on the record/ in this context, means more than mere assumption or absence 
of evidence contrary to the 'new5 ground or theory. The record must contain sufficient 
and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or theory to place a person of 
ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal." 
State v. Montoya supra. 
The right to a hearing and die opportunity to present evidence and arguments is a 
fundamental due process requirement. This right has little meaning or worth unless one 
is informed of the theories upon which the opposing party relies. 
2. Utah Code Annotated 62A-12-232(1) (a) (i) was not complied with when the Defendant 
was committed into the custody of the local mental health authority. The warrandess 
searches were not justified by an implied exception to the warrant requirement created 
by 62A-12-231(l)(a) and/or 62A-12-232(4) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 As Amended. 
If the statute does create an implied exception, then it is limited by constitutional 
protections. 
a.Utah Code Annotated 62A-12-232(1) (a) (i) was not complied with when the Defendant 
was committed into the custody of the local mental health authority. Utah Code 
Annotated 62A-12-232(1) (a) (i) and (ii) requires that: 
"62A-12-232. Temporary commitment - Requirements and procedures. 
(l)(a) An adult may be temporarily committed to a local mental health audiority upon: 
(i) written application by a responsible person who has reason to know, stating a belief diat the 
individual is likely to cause serious injury to himself or odiers if not immediately 
restrained, and stating the personal knowledge of the individual's condition or circumstances which 
lead to that belief; and 
(ii) a certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner stating that the 
physician or designated examiner has examined the individual widiin a three-day period 
91070.05\Brief.wpd 15 
immediately preceding that certification, and that he is of the opinion that tlie individual 
is mentally ill and, because of his mental illness, is likely to injure himself or others if not 
immediately restrained/' (emphasis added) 
The certification required by 62A4 2-232(1) (a) (ii) is all that was completed. [R. 43] There 
was no written application by "a responsible person who has reason to know" based 
upon "personal knowledge" in existence in this case as required. The Defendant's 
commitment into the custody of tlie local mental health authority was defective and 
invalid. Deputy Yeates and Officer Baty had no legal authority to deliver the Defendant 
to the mental health unit of die Logan Regional Hospital. The lower court's implied 
exception theory to the warrant requirement would of necessity only apply in a case 
where there was a valid commitment into the custody of the local mental health 
authority. Without a valid commitment the police do not have legal authority to 
transport or otherwise place a person into the custody of tlie local mental health 
authority. The warrantless searches of die Defendant's person and belongings can not 
be justified by an implied exception to die warrant requirement as held by the lower 
court. This court stated in State v Larocco supra, "exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14." 
b.The lower court held that an implied exception to tlie warrant requirement was created 
by 62A-12-231(l)(a) and 62A-12-232(4) Utah Code Annotated. The Court stated, 
"Independent of any odier analysis, the court holds diat Utah Code Ann. §62A-12-
231(1) (a) and 232(4) authorkes a search incident to taking a proposed mental heakh 
patient into custody. Cf. State v. Lowrimore. 67 Wn. App 949,956-57,841 P.2d 779,783 
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(1992)." [R. 50-51, Addendum 5] The lower court relied upon and cited as basis for the 
implied exception theory the Washington case of State v. Lowrimore supra to justify its 
holding that there was an implied exception to the warrant requirement created by the 
Utah mental health statute. However, the searches in the case of State v. Lowrimore 
supra, were not upheld on an implied exception created by the Washington state mental 
health statute. The Washington court justified its ruling with the "emergency situation" 
exception to the warrant requirement. The Washington court stated, 
"Rather, this case is controlled by the well established 'emergency situation' exception 
to the warrant requirement in the area of non-criminal investigations and action. State 
v. Lynd. 54 Wash.App. 18, 771 P.2d 770 (1989). 
The Lyndcourt formulated the rule for the emergency exception rule as follows: 
In order for a search to come within the emergency exception, we must be satisfied that 
the claimed emergency was not simply a pretext for conducting an evidentiary search and 
instead was 'actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance.' [State v. 
Loewen, 97 Wn.2d [562] at 563 [647 P.2d 489 (1982)]. To that end, the State must show 
that: (1) the searching officer subjectively believed an emergency existed; and (2) a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances would have thought an emergency existed. 
Loewen, 97 Wn.2d at 568 [647 P.2d 489]; . . . In addition, there must be some reasonable 
basis to associate the emergency with the place searched." 
c.Even if the Utah mental health statute created an implied exception to the warrant 
requirement as the lower court held, it would by necessity be limited by constitutional 
protections. The statute can not dispense with the constitutional requirement that there 
be probable cause that a danger existed which justified dispensing with the court's 
oversight in granting the warrant. Likewise, exigent circumstances must exist which 
require action before a warrant can be obtained. There must be a persuasive reason why 
the officer can not take time to obtain a warrant. Both probable cause and exigent 
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circumstances must be present at the time of the search. The burden is upon the state 
to establish probable cause and exigent circumstances. All of these constitutional 
standards have been applied as a condition under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution warrant 
requirements. State v. Larocco supra; State v. Christensen supra; Katz v. United States. 
supra 
The state did not carry its burden to establish facts that probable cause and exigent 
circumstances existed at the time of the warrantless searches which justified dispensing 
with the judicial oversight required to obtain a warrant. 
The warrantless searches in this case were not justified by the "emergency 
circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement. 
The lower court concluded that the warrantless searches were justified by the 
"emergency circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement. However, the 
doctrine adopted by this court in the case of Salt Lake City v. Davidson supra and 
suggested by Judge Greenwood in her concurring opinion in State vs. Yoder, 1997 UT 
App, 935 P.2d 534, is the "emergency aid doctrine" sometimes referred to as the 
"medical emergency doctrine."3 The Utah Supreme Court in adopting the "community 
caretaker doctrine," Provo City v. Warden. 1992 UT App, 844 P.2d 360, imposed the 
3The nomenclature used by this court and Judge Greenwood emphasizes the limited 
scope of the doctrine to give someone emergency medical assistance where there is imminent 
danger to life and limb. 
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". . .requirement of imminent danger to life or limb as a component of the 
reasonableness test because of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of'the right of the 
people to be secure' against arbitrary invasions by the government." 
In adopting the emergency aid doctrine, Salt Lake City v. Davidson supra imposed the 
following requirements which must be established by facts: 
"(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists and 
believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or place to 
be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be searched and the 
emergency." Id. at |^12 
The Davidson court also addressed the meaning of "reasonable basis" and stated, 
"Because this reasonable basis must approximate probable cause and is used to 
justify abrogation of Fourth Amendment rights, emergency searches should be 
'strictly circumscribed by [circumstances] which justify it initiation"' Id. at f^ 15 
The state did not carry its burden to establish that Deputy Yeates and Officer Baty had 
an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed and that tlieir 
warrantless searches of the Defendant's person and his belongings were necessary for 
the protection of life. There was simply no nexus between the searches and any needed 
assistance for the protection of life. Officer Baty's warrantless search of the Defendant's 
belongings was more consistent with an intent to discover evidence than to "aid" in the 
protection of life. There was no legitimate reason for Officer Baty's search of the 
Defendant's belongings. 
91070 05\Bnefwpd 19 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the lower court's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
and remand the case with direction that die evidence discovered as a result of die warrantless 
searches be suppressed. 
DATED this j 2 d ^ 2 y of December, 2001. 
102 South 100 West 
P. O. Box 461 
Brigham City, UT 8*302 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of die foregoing document to: 
Laura B. Dupaix 
Assistant Attorney General 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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ADDENDUM 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Curtis W. Collins, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
FILED , 
M V * f t of Appeals 
JUN 2 9 2001 
Pautetts Siagg 
ORDER 
Case No. 20010371-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Davis. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is granted. 
Dated thi s 
/ 
day of June, 2001 
FOR THE COURT: 
^%3<Z&!e&&. f° P^&eo<s** 
.fame-La r* ^ ^ ^ r,. - _ ^ ^ 
Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on June 29, 2001, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
JACK H. MOLGARD 
MOLGARD & HUNSAKER 
102 S 100 W 
PO BOX 4 61 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302 
T, FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
By &ML rYfcofrt/^ 
Deptrty Clerk; t- N 
Case No. 20010371 
ADDENDUM 2 
Jack H. Molgard #2290 
Attorney at Law 
102 South 100 West 
P.O. Box 461 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
(435) 723^8569 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN A N D FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H 
STATE OF UTAH, ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
CURTIS W. COLLINS, ) CASE#: 001100553FS 
Defendant. ) Judge: Ben H. Hatlfield 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through his auorney, Jack H. Molgard, and mo\ > the 
Court for an order suppressing all evidence discovered and/or seized on July 27, 2000 as a result of 
the search of the Defendant's person by Chief Deputy Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder County She ilfs 
Office, and all evidence discovered and/or seized as a result of the search by Officer J. Baty of the I * x^ 
Elder County Sheriffs Office of the Defendant's wallet and knife sheath both taken from '*« 
Defendant's person by Chief Deputy Lynn Yeates. 
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons that these searches were with »ut 
a search warrant and were unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution in violation of 
the Defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States and the Utah State Constitution. 
DATED this J!//fay of March, 2001. 
orr//y^ 
k H. Molgard 
Attorney for the Defendant 
102 South 100 West 
P.O. Box461 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I-matted a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to: 
Jon J. Bunderson, Attorney at Law, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, UT 84302. 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2001. 
Secretary j 
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Jack H. Molgard #2290 
Attorney at Law 
102 South 100 West 
P.O. Box461 
BrighamCto UT 84302 
(435) 723*85^9 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
CURTIS W. COLLINS, ) CASE#: 001100553FS 
Defendant. ) Judge: Ben H. Hadfield 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through his attorney, Jack H. Molgard, and submi 
the following Memorandum in support of his Motion to Suppress. 
I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Defendant has been charged with possession of a controlled substance which "ras 
discovered in a knife sheath taken from the Defendant's person on July 27, 2000 at the Loj» m 
Regional Hospital Mental Health Unit by Chief Deputy Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder County 
Sheriffs Office after the Defendant had been delivered to the Mental Health Unit under tl^ 
authority of a "Certificate for Commitment to the Local Mental Health Authority Emergent y 
Procedure," a true and copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit "A" and by refetence mat! 
a part hereof. 
91070 05\MotSuppress553 wptl 
IL FACTS 
The relevant facts which support the Defendant's Motion to Suppress are containc I in 
Officer Brent Erickson's "Narcotic Offense Investigation Narrative" specifically the deputy'0 
narrative, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B" and by reference 
made a part hereof, and in Officer J, Baty's "Supplemental Report," a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto marked Exhibit "C" and by reference made a part hereof. Said facts were testified 
to by the witnesses at the Preliminary Hearing on January 17,2001. The relevant facts are as follows: 
I The Defendant went to an appointment with Dr. William F. Weber at the Bear River Mental 
Health office in Brigham City on July 27, 2000, Dr. Weber concluded that the Defendant 
had not been taking his medication and that he needed to be hospitalized. 
2. Dr. Weber caused the Certificate for Commitment to the Local Mental Health Authority 
Emergency Procedure to be executed and the Brigham City Police Department was c tiled to 
deliver the Defendant to the Brigham City Community Hospital. 
3. When the police arrived they took the Defendant into custody and walked him ovei to the 
Brigham City Community Hospital Exigency Room where they searched him and where 
drugs were administered to the Defendant to calm him down. 
4. The Brigham City Ambulance transported the Defendant to the Logan Regional I hospital. 
Chief Deputy Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder County Sheriffs Office was a memlx r of the 
ambulance crew. Officer J. Baty of the Box Elder Sheriffs Office also rode alonq on the 
ambulance to Logan. The Defendant's hands were handcuffed behind him on the trip t-
Logan. 
5. When the ambulance arrived at the Logan Regional Hospital, Office J. Baty, Chief Depui 
Lynn Yeates and two (2) other members of the ambulance crew took the Defendant into ti 
Mental Health Unit of the hospital. 
6. In the Mental Health Unit "Chief Deputy Yeates did a complete pat down search of Mi. 
Collins." Chief Deputy Yeates removed the Defendant's wallet from his back pocket aiv * a 
knife sheath from inside the front of his pants and gave them to Officer Baty. 
91070 0S\MotSnppress5S3 wpd 2 
7. Officer Baty searched the wallet and found a baggy containing a green, leafy substance. 
Officer Baty also opened the knife sheath and found a small baggy with a white powdery 
substance inside. Officer Baty also discovered a straw and several pieces of foil with a burnt 
substance on them. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution, prohibit all unreasonable searches and seizures. The law is well settled 
"warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under both the state and federal constitutions." [.State 
vs.Morck&2\ P.2d, 1190 (Utah App. 1991); State vs.Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460, (Utah \990);Kaizvs. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, (1967); State vs. Wright, 977 P. 2d, 1283 (Utah App. 1999); State vs. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P. 2d, 289 (Utah 1995); State vs. Brown, 853 P. 2d, 851 (Utah 1992)1 
The warrant requirement is "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions," the State bears the burden of establishing the compliance with one of the exceptions. 
[State vs. Larocco, 794 P. 2d, 470 (Utah 1990); State vs. Christensen, 676 P. 2D, 408 (Utah 1984); 
State vs. Limb, 581 P. 2d, 142 (Utah 1978)] 
This case does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
There were no exigent circumstances that justified dispensing with the judicial oversight whic 'i 
comes from the warrant requirement. There was no probable cause that justified either the seaa h 
by Chief Deputy Yeates or the search by Officer Baty. Even if a recognized exception to the warrdnt 
requirement could be identified the state bears the burden of establishing both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances in order for a warrantless search to fall within the exception. [State vs. Morck, 
supra) 
WHEREFORE the Etefendant requests his Motion to Suppress be granted. 
DATED this . ^ f l f c y of March, 2001. ^ \ 
Ja^k'H. Molgard 
^Attorney for the Defendant 
' 102 South 100 West 
P.O. Box461 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
n? 'S 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I-moiled a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to: 
Jon J. Bunderson, Attorney at Law, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, UT 84302. 
DATED this 2vy\ day of March, 2001. 
Secretary 0 
Exhibit "A" 
l^ftTJFICATE FOR C O M M I T M E K ^ i O THE 
LOCAL MENTAL HEALTH AUTHORITY 
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 
l do hereby certify that I am a 
physician licensed under the laws of the State of Utah to practice n ^icine, or a medical off .er 
of the United States Government in the State of Utah in the performance of m^offrcial duties, or 
a designated examiner appointed by the Divisior^of Mental Jjealth that I have examined wh in 
three days of the date of this certificate UusCflS CGLLIWS 
and am of the opinion that the said CutfrlJ COLLIQl " is 
mentally ill and because of that illness is likely to injure Hl^i self or others if not / 
immediately restrained. The pertinent data which I have obtain^aVer^ffi *U\Mtuli 
Dated this 2 7 ~ t t day of Uu^i^
 J ' ^ ^ " ^ C T O "'"*"* ' 
^ ^ ^ Z ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' Signature {IAV\S^\^ 
fUJUh 
afecTExaminer) 
Address 
'Cross out items not applicable. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
For emergency commitment of an individual who, in the judgment of the applicant and a 
licensed physician or designated examiner, cannot go unrestrained. If a physician or designated 
examiner is not available, a peace officer or a mental health officer with personafknowledge of 
the situation may use DMH Form 34-2. A peace officer mayTrahs^rtfa!patfeh("using DMH 
Form 34-2 (pink) pursuant to this provision either on the basis of his or her own observation or 
on the basis of the obseivation of a mental health officer reported by the mental health officer. 
The application of either 34-1 or 34-2 authorizes a peace officer to take the proposed patirnt 
into custody, and transport him or her to a mental health facility. 
Any person admitted under this section may be held for a maximum of 24 hours excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. At the expiration of that time period, the person shall be 
released unless application for involuntary hospitalization has been commenced pursuant to 
section 62a-12-234. If such application has been made an order of detention may be entered uy 
the coun pursuant lo subsection (3) of section 62a-12-234. If no order of detention is issued, the 
patient shall be released except when the patient has made voluntary application for admission 
Exhibit "B 
Narrative; 
Narcotic Offense Investigation Narrative 
1. Description of the Offense: Out of Control Individual 
2. Type of Narcotic; Street Value: Meth 
3. Paraphernalia Involved; If Any; Glass Pipe and Plastic Straw 
4. Witne s Observations: Individual was out of control 
5. Deputy's Narrative, Date, ^-me, Action Taken: July 27, 2000 
I responded to Bear Ri .rer Mental Health on a report of an 
out of control individual. When I arrived, I found Curtis Collins 
sitting on the steps in front of the building. I got out and made 
contact with Mr. Collins because he matched the description I had been 
given. As I approached, Mr. Collins started yelling again. I kept my 
distance/ and waited for the other officers to arrive. When officer 
Mankin and Burnharo arrived, we had a chance to speak with Mr. Collins 
mother, and a case worker from Bear River Mental Health. 
They stated that Mr. Collins had come down for his check up with 
the doctor. While he was there he started to get out of control. 
Doctor Weber felt he had not been taking his medication, and that he 
needed t.» be hospitalized. For some reason, Mr Collins went outside, 
and his problem got worse. Mr, Collins started to get violent and more out of 
control. Mr. Collins mother, and the case workers feared for their safety, 
and so ihey locked the door. ASter locking the'door, Mr. Collins tried to 
reenter the building only to find the door locked. Mr, Collins proceeds 1 to 
beat on the glass door and yell trying to get in. At that point we cal] d 
you. l > remained on scene and waited for Doctor Weber to fill out all the 
needed locuments. After a shojt while, Dr. Weber came out and informed us 
that he needed to go to the h^pi'-al, and that he was not going to go on his 
own. At that point, Dr. Weber also gave us the signed involuntary comm'tment 
form. 'Uice we had the signed form, we took Mr. Collins in to custody with 
minimai resistance. We then walked him across the parking lot to the 
emergen y room. Prior to taking him into the emergency room, we conducted a 
better .search. During the search, we discovered a few item stuck down in Mr. 
Collins boots. No other items were discovered at this time. 
Officer Burnham and I stood by in the emergency room with Mr. 
Collins while they administered drugs to calm him down. We then 
remained on scene, until the ambulance and transporting Deputy's 
arrived. Mr. Collins was transported to Logan Hospital by ambulance. 
Deputy J. Baty rode in the ambulance for the transport.' Also Deputy L. 
Yates was in the ambulance, as a member of the ambulance personnel. 
When the ambulance left the hospital, we cleared the scene. 
Approximately one hour later, the ambulance returned to the cit,r 
and stated over the radio that they had some further evidence for this 
case. When the ambulance came by the Police Department, I went out am 
met Deputy's Yates and Baty. When they got out of the ambulance, Deputy 
Baty, han led me a plastic bag. Inside the plastic bag was a knife 
sheath fi Ll of stuff. They then stated that when they got to Logan 
Hospital they discovered the item hidden in Mr. Collins genitalia 
during M \ admittance process. At that point, Deputy Baty took 
possesi* *i of the item. The item was in her possession, until she handed 
it to \m. 
Upon examination of the item, I discovered that the sheath 
contained a baggy of possible meth, and a baggy of some unknown subsU- "e. 
There was'also a used glass pipe, and a straw. I booked the items into 
evidence?, and started to work on the report. The next day on 07-28-00 «i> 1500, 
Detective Vincent flash tested the substance. The test showed positive 
for meth. The items will be sent to the lab on 07-31-00 
6. Date, Time, Reporting Deputy Officer Ericksen Fri Jul 28 16:15:29 l'TT 2000 
Exhibit "C» 
':!pplemental Report 
At approximately 2000 hrs I was asked to do a transport with Deputy Hoffman to Logan Regional Hospital 
CM a Curtis Collins. When Deputy Hoffman and I arrived at Brigham Hospital we were advised that Mr. Collins had 
! ivn heavily sedated because he was being uncooperative and hostile with the hospital staff and Brigham Officers. 
i ihis time we were told that Mr. Collins was going to be transported by ambulance. It was decided that I would 
i. le on the ambulance with the ambulancel:rew*j«Deputy Lynn Yeates was also on the ambulance crew. 
During the course of the transport Mr Collins was handcuffed behind his back. When we arrived at Logan 
; \:gional myself, Chief Deputy Lynn Yeates, and two other ambulance workers took Mr. Collins into the mental unit 
i the hospital. Chief Deputy Yeates did a complete pat down search on Mr. Collins. Chief Deputy Yeates handed 
,.ie a wallet that was in Mr. Collins back pocket and a knife sheath that was inside the front of his pants. I searched 
i:j wallet and found a baggy of green leafy substance. I also opened the knife sheath and found a small baggy with a 
hite powdery substance inside it. There was also several pieces of foil with a burnt substance on it and a straw. 1 
'• ./pi these items in my possession and put them in a large plastic bag. When we arrived in Brigham, Chief Deputy 
//ales contacted Brigham PD and advised them of the items that were found. We went directly to BCPD and I 
11 isoually handed Officer Erickson the items that were found on Curtis Collins. 
; :ui of Report 
•ilicer J. Baty 
i'liSO Corrections 
ADDENDUM 3 
1 
62A-12-232. Temporary commitment - Requirements and procedures. 
(1) (a) An adult may be temporarily, involuntarily committed to a local mental health 
authority upon: 
(i) written application by a responsible person who has reason to know, stating a belief th t 
the individual is likely to cause serious injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained, 
and stating the personal knowledge of the individual's condition or circumstances which lead to 
that belief; and 
(ii) a certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner slating that the physician 
or designated examiner has examined the individual within a three-day period immediately 
preceding that certification, and that he is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and, 
because of his mental illness, is likely 10 injure himself or others if not immediately restrained. 
fb) Application and certification as described in Subsection (l)(a) authorizes any peace 
officer to take the individual mto the custody of a local mental health authority and transport the 
individual to that authority's designated facility. 
(2) If a duly authorized peace officer observes a person involved in conduct that gives the 
officer piobable cause to believe that the person is mentally ill, as defined in Section 
62A-12-202. and because of that apparent mental illness and conduct, there is a substantia! 
likelihood of serious harm to that person or others, pending proceedings for examination ar \ 
certification under this part, the officer may take that person into protective custody. The peace 
officer shall transport the person to be transported to the designated facility of the appropriate 
local mental health authority pursuant to this section, either on the basis of his own observation 
or on the basis of a mental health officer's observation that has been reported to him by that 
mental health officer. Immediately thereafter, the officer shall place the person in the custody of 
the local mental health authority and make application for commitment of that person to the 
local mental health authority The application shall be on a prescribed form and shall include the 
following: 
(a) a statement by the officer that he believes, on the basis of personal observation or on the 
basis of a mental health officer's observation reported to him by the mental health officer, that 
the person is, as a result of a mental illness, a substantial and immediate danger to himself or 
others; 
(b) the specific nature of the danger; 
(c) a summary of the observations upon which the statement of danger is based; and 
(d) a statement of facts which called the person to the attention of the officer. 
(3) A person committed under this section may be held for a maximum of 24 hours, 
excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. At the expiration of that time period, the 
person shall be released unless application for involuntary commitment has been commenced 
<w 200 1 Matthew Hender <fe Company, Inc , a member of the i exis-Nexis* (rroup All nghts reserved 
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pursuant to Section 62A-12-234. If that application has been made, an order of detention may be 
entered under Subsection 62A-12-234(3). If no order of detention is issued, the patient shall be 
released unless he has made voluntary application for admission. 
(4) Transportation of mentally ill persons pursuant to Subsections (1) and (2) shall be 
conducted by the appropriate municipal, or city or town, law enforcement authority or, under the 
appropriate law enforcement's authority, by ambulance to the extent that Subsection (5) applies. 
However, if the de. ignated facility is outside of that authority's jurisdiction, the appropriate 
county sheriff shall transport the person or cause the person to be transported by ambulance to 
the extent that Subsection (5) applies. 
(5) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (4), a peace officer shall cause a person to be 
transported by ambulance if the person meets any of the criteria in Section 26-8a-305. In 
addition, if the person requires physical medical attention, the peace officer shall direct that 
transportation be to an appropriate medical facility for treatment. 
History: C 1953, 62A-12-232, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 1, § 376; 1989, ch. 1, § 3; 1989, ch. 
161, § 12; 1992, ch. 231, § 8; 1993, ch. 285, § 12; 1995, ch, 142, § 2; 1999, ch. 141, § 51. 
e 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the Lexis-Nexis* Group All rights reserved 
ADDENDUM 4 
Jon J. Bunderson 
Box Elder County Attorney 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
(435) 734-9464 
IN AND FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CURTIS VV COLLINS, 
Defendant. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
SUPPRESSION MOTION 
£€-1100953^ 
Case No WHm63^-r^-
JudgcBenH HadfieM 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its attorney of record, hereby opposes the 
defendant's motion to suppress and reserves the right to reply to the issues raised by defendant at 
hearing. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
For the purposes of this response, the State accepts the facts as stated in the defendant's 
brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The search was incident to arrest. The defendant was placed under arrest and was 
transported to a secure mental facility for involuntary commitment. Therefore, the search is 
justified under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
POrNT 1: THE ANALYSIS SHOULD PROCEED UNDER THE 
"INCIDENT TO ARREST" DOCTRINE AND NOT UNDER 
FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEIZURE" DOCTRINE 
The defense's position is that the evidence should be suppressed because the search was 
not authorized by warrant. However, the search falls within a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement and therefore did not implicate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In United 
States v. Robinson. 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustavson v. Florida, 414 U S. 260 (1973), the 
Supreme Court held that when a "lawful custodial arrest'' occurs, a full search of the arrestee may 
be made, even though no basis exists to believe that either evidence of a crime or a weapon is on 
the person. See New York v. Beltoiu 453 U.S. 454, 459, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2863, 69 L.Ed.2cl 768 
(1981) (" '[IJn the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of aw person is i;~: only du 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search 
under that Amendment.'" (quoting United States v. Robinson. 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 
477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973))). Under Utah Law, "[t]he general rule requiring a warrant for 
governmental searches also does not apply to a search of a person being placed under arrest and 
objects in that person's possession." State v. Cornwall 810 P.2d 484, (Utah App. 1991). (Citing 
Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); State v. Banks. 720 
P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Utah 1986); and State v. Avala, 762P.2d 1107, 1111-12 (Utah 
Ct App. 1988)). "A person is under arrest for fourth amendment purposes when, under the 
circumstances, "a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Florida 
v Rover, 460 U.S. 491,502. 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 
The facts in this case indicate that Collins was not free to Ic^vc ^Len !*e ;^3 u:!;e:; by the 
officers to a secure mental health facility, and he does not contest the legality of that arrest. It is 
clear from the record that the defendant was in custody and had been transported to the hospital 
for involuntary commitment. The defendant was in handcuffs and had been remanded to the 
curtody of the Brigham City Police. No warrant was therefore required to search the items taken 
£ om Collins and seize them Therefore, the search was incident to arrest, and there is no basis for 
excluding the fruits of the search 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's motion to suppress is properly denied. And, the State moves the court to 
dismiss the same. 
DATED this §^_ day of March, 2001. _ „ ^ ^ / ? 
""""jarfi J. Bunderson, 
/Box Elder County Attorney 
State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I maile*' a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Jack H. Molgard 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 461 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
DATED this J ^ ^ a y of March, 2001. 
ADDENDUM 5 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CURTIS W. COLLINS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 001100553 
1 HON. BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The 
facts are not in dispute. On 27 July 2000, Deputy Ericksen responded to a call on an 
"out of control" individual at the Bear River Mental Health facility. He found the 
Defendant sitting on the steps in front of the building. Additional officers arrived. The 
officers then learned that the Defendant had come with his mother for his regular 
appointment with his doctor, but that Defendant's mother and the case worker at the 
Mental Health facility locked the Mental Health Facility door behind Mr. Collins when 
he went outside the facility because Mr. Collins was our of control and they were afraid 
for their safety. 
The doctor then emerged with a "Certificate for Commitment to the Local 
Mental Health Authority" form that met the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 62 A-12-
232(A)(1) including his opinion that Defendant was "likely to injure himself or others 
if not immediately restrained." The Doctor requested that the officers take the 
Defendant into custody and transport him to the hospital. The officers took the 
Defendant into custody and walked him across the parking lot to the emergency room. 
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At this point the officers apparently conducted a search of the Defendant and found 
several items in the Defendant's boots, but a knife sheath in his pants went undetected. 
The emergency room staff medicated the Defendant to calm him down. 
The officers then turned the Defendant over to another officer and the 
ambulance crew who transported the Defendant to Logan Regional Hospital. During 
the transport, the Defendant was handcuffed. The officer's did another pat down search 
of the Defendant during the admittance process at Logan Regional Hospital. During this 
search they found a knife sheath that had been hidden around the Defendant's genitalia. 
One of the officers opened the knife sheath and found a small baggy with a white 
powdery substance and several pieces of foil with a burnt substance on it and a straw. 
The white powdery substance tested positive for merJhamphetamine. Defendant now 
seeks to suppress the evidence from the knife sheath. 
In this case the officers did not arrest the Defendant but were taking him into 
custody pursuant to the State's involuntary commitment procedure pursuant to statute. 
The statute authorizes the Defendant be taken into custody when a physician or 
examiner certifies the need or when the officer has probable cause to believe the person 
is mentally ill and that there is a substantial likelihood that the mental illness and 
conduct may result in the individual seriously harming himself or others. Utah Code 
Ann. § 62 A-12-231(1 )(b) The court believes there is an implied authorization to conduct 
a safety and inventory search of such an individual in such circumstances because he 
or she is a danger to themselves or others and allowing the search will protect him as 
well as others. Common sense dictates that an officer be allowed to conduct a search 
of a dangerous individual when taking him or her into custody. Independent of any 
other analysis, the court holds that Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-23 l(l)(a) and 232(4) 
3 
authorizes a search incident to taking a proposed mental health patient into custody. Cf 
State v. Lowrimore, 61 Wn. App. 949, 956-57, 841 P.2d 779, 783 (1992)("the purpose 
of the search impliedly authorized [by the analogous Washington statute] is the 
protection of others, not limited to the officer in question, and often, as in the case 
before us, primarily for the protection of the individual detained/') 
Even if the search was not impliedly authorized by the statute, the court finds 
that the officers were engaged in a valid community caretaking role so that the searches 
came within the "emergency circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement. This 
exception has its roots in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed. 
2d 706 (1973) where the U.S. Supreme Court found that the warrantless search of the 
trunk of a car for a service revolver did not violate the fourth amendment because the 
officers were performing a community caretaking role in retrieving the potentially 
dangerous instrument. The Cady case has been extended to a variety of circumstances 
around the country, including, in Utah, validating a stop of a vehicle because the officer 
suspected a potential suicide. See Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) aff'd Provo City v. Warden, 875 P.2d 557 (1994) see also Wright v. State, 7 
S.W.3d 148 (Ct. Crim. App. Tx. 1999)(discussing the various cases from around the 
country). Justice Greenwood suggested the exception as an alternate way to affirm in 
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(Officers conducted search to find 
missing child). Her suggestion was picked up and adopted as Utah law by the court in 
Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 994 P.2d 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)(finding the emergency 
aid exception could allow a warrantless search of a bystander of an overdose victim but 
that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to satisfy the connection between 
the emergency and the search) but see State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1997)(drug victim that may have needed medical attention but confession did not come 
under emergency circumstances where officers could have given Miranda warnings 
before asking question designed to render medical assistance). 
Whether the emergency circumstances or the community caretaker exception 
are separate exceptions or one in the same, a search incident to taking a mental health 
patient into custody should qualify. See State v. Lowrimore, 841 P.2d 779 (Wn Ct. App. 
1992)(search of juvenile's purse and container within purse valid under emergency 
circumstances where juvenile had threatened suicide); State v. Brock, 782 P.2d 572 (Wn. 
Ct. App. 1989)(mental health patient, multiple pat downs valid). Assuming that the test 
for the emergency exception applies in this circumstance, the court must find that: 
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an 
emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for their 
assistance for the protection of life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and 
seize evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with 
the area or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection 
with the area to be searched and the emergency. 
Davidson, 994 P.2d at 1290. There can be no doubt the officers had an objectively 
reasonable basis to believe an emergency existed. They had a document from an expert, 
eyewitness statements, and their own observations. The court cannot conceive of a 
more compelling case. Under the circumstances multiple searches would not only be 
reasonable but prudent as if the Defendant had hurt himself or someone else with a 
weapon or other item the whole world would fault the officers. The court finds that the 
5 
search was not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize the evidence. Finally, 
the only "area" searched was the Defendant's person. The nexus between the danger to 
the Defendant and others is obvious. 
The court notes that the Defendant was sedated and that he was handcuffed 
during the trip to Logan, but these facts make no difference. Again, if the officers had 
not been diligent in searching the Defendant and he had harmed himself or another, no 
one would raise the unreasonableness of such a search in defense of the officers. 
Under either an implied statutory right or the community caretaker or 
emergency circumstances exceptions, the motion to suppress is denied. 
Dated this ^ day of April 2001. 
